Tashkent, Uzbekistan (UzDaily.uz) — The first Central Asia-Republic of Korea Summit highlights a qualitative shift in the economic agenda between Seoul and the countries of the region.
While trade, individual investment projects and infrastructure cooperation previously formed the basis of engagement, the focus is now shifting toward critical minerals, industrial cooperation, energy, digital technologies and the development of new supply chains.
For South Korea, this is not simply about expanding its presence in a new market. For a country whose economy depends on stable access to imported raw materials while being home to major industrial and technology companies, Central Asia is gaining strategic importance.
South Korea’s New Interest in Central Asia
The economic logic behind South Korea’s policy is relatively clear. Seoul is interested in diversifying sources of raw materials, reducing dependence on individual suppliers and strengthening the resilience of its own production chains.
Central Asia has several advantages in this regard.
The region has significant reserves of uranium, copper, chromium, zinc, rare earth elements and other strategically important resources. At the same time, Central Asian states are seeking to develop raw-material processing, industrial production and technological capabilities.
The interests of the two sides are therefore gradually beginning to converge.
Central Asia offers resources, energy, growing markets and a strategic geographic position. South Korea offers technology, industrial equipment, investment capital and access to global production chains.
This combination could form the basis of a new stage of cooperation.
Critical Minerals Become a Central Focus
Critical minerals are the most illustrative example.
South Korea views access to strategic raw materials as an element of its economic security. Such materials are needed to produce batteries, semiconductors, electronics, electric vehicles, energy equipment and other high-tech products.
For Seoul, it is therefore important not only to purchase raw materials but also to create more resilient chains for their supply and processing.
In September 2026, South Korea held its first joint meeting of industry ministers with all five Central Asian countries. Industrial cooperation, supply chains and critical minerals were at the center of the talks.
This is an important signal. Economic relations are gradually moving from individual commercial projects to the institutional level of economic security.
Kazakhstan as a Key Resource Partner
The largest opportunities are emerging for Kazakhstan.
The country has a significant mineral resource base while also possessing the most developed transport infrastructure and substantial industrial potential in Central Asia.
However, it is important for Kazakhstan not to repeat the traditional model of cooperation in which a foreign partner gains access to raw materials while most of the added value is created outside the country.
Korean investment could be particularly significant if it is linked to deep processing, localization of production, technology transfer and specialist training.
This is where the most promising model emerges:
Kazakh raw materials → Korean technologies → processing in Kazakhstan → production of high-value-added goods → exports to external markets.
If such a model is implemented, Kazakhstan could gain considerably more than additional investment in the extractive sector.
Nuclear Energy as a Separate Area
Energy is becoming another important element of cooperation.
On 15 September, Kazakhstan and South Korea signed a memorandum on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This area deserves particular attention because Kazakhstan is one of the world’s largest uranium producers, while South Korea has significant experience in the construction and operation of nuclear facilities.
The interests of the two countries may also be complementary in this area.
Kazakhstan has a resource base and is interested in developing its energy infrastructure. South Korea is interested in promoting its own technologies and expertise.
Nuclear energy could therefore potentially become one of the largest long-term areas of bilateral cooperation.
Uzbekistan: A Different Model of Korean Engagement
If Kazakhstan is primarily of resource and energy interest to South Korea and effectively occupies a central place in the new economic agenda, Uzbekistan remains in the background compared with the other countries of the region.
Uzbekistan has a different set of advantages: a large domestic market, a substantial industrial base, a labor force and opportunities for locating production. Korean strategy in Uzbekistan is therefore increasingly focused on localizing industrial production.
For Seoul, this provides an opportunity to gain access to a growing market while using Uzbekistan as a production base. For Tashkent, the benefit lies in the opportunity to attract not only capital but also modern technologies, equipment and management expertise.
Nevertheless, despite these advantages, Uzbekistan has yet to move to the forefront of South Korea’s Central Asia policy. The main negotiations on critical minerals, industrial cooperation and energy are primarily being conducted with Kazakhstan, while the Uzbek direction remains more supportive and complementary.
As a result, an economic division of roles is gradually emerging within the region: Kazakhstan could serve as a major supplier of resources and energy, Uzbekistan as a second-tier industrial and production base, while other Central Asian countries could participate in individual segments of regional supply chains.
Artificial Intelligence and Digitalization
Another trend is the gradual expansion of cooperation beyond traditional industry.
Artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure and production automation are becoming independent areas of South Korean policy in Central Asia.
This is particularly important for the countries of the region. The use of South Korean technologies could allow them to modernize enterprises without having to independently go through the entire process of technological development.
However, there is also a risk of dependence.
If Central Asia only purchases ready-made digital solutions without developing its own specialists, software products and research base, technological cooperation could lead not to the creation of its own digital economy but to a new form of technological dependence.
Technology transfer is therefore becoming no less important than the volume of investment.
The China Factor
South Korea’s growing economic engagement is taking place against the backdrop of China’s already large-scale presence.
Beijing remains the largest economic partner for many Central Asian countries and has significant advantages in trade, infrastructure, energy and the extractive sector.
The Korean model, however, is different.
China can offer Central Asia large-scale infrastructure financing and access to a huge consumer market.
South Korea has particularly strong positions in such sectors as automobile manufacturing, electronics, batteries, shipbuilding, energy, industrial automation and digital technologies.
For Central Asian states, the emergence of another major technology and investment partner therefore creates an opportunity to diversify their foreign economic relations.
This is particularly important for Kazakhstan.
Competition among different external partners can be used not as a geopolitical choice of one side over another but as a tool for securing better conditions for national economies.
Who Will Capture the Added Value?
However, an increase in Korean investment alone does not guarantee structural modernization of Central Asian economies.
The central question is where the added value will be created.
If Central Asia exports concentrates and raw materials and then imports finished batteries, electronic components, equipment and technologies, the economic model will not fundamentally change.
If the countries of the region can instead establish processing facilities, industrial clusters, research centers and joint production ventures, cooperation with South Korea could become a factor in structural transformation.
This is why negotiations on critical minerals should be viewed more broadly than simply as agreements on supplies.
For Kazakhstan, an optimal outcome would be to create a complete, or at least substantial, segment of the value chain within the country.
A New Economic Geography of Central Asia
The first Central Asia-Republic of Korea Summit reflects a broader process.
Central Asia is gradually transforming from a peripheral destination in the foreign economic policies of major powers into an independent hub in global supply chains.
China is interested in the region as a source of resources, a market and a transit territory. The European Union is increasing its focus on critical minerals, transport routes and investment. South Korea is betting on combining the region’s resource base with its own industrial and technological capabilities.
For Central Asia, this creates a rare opportunity.
Competition among external partners could become a source of economic modernization, provided the countries of the region compete not for investment as such, but for investment that creates long-term added value within national economies.
In this context, engagement with South Korea is of interest not only as another channel for attracting capital.
It could become part of a broader strategy to shift Central Asia from resource exports toward participation in the production of next-generation technologies and goods.
The economic outcome of the region’s current rapprochement with South Korea will depend on the ability of Central Asian countries to use this opportunity rather than simply accept new investment projects.
