Tashkent, Uzbekistan (UzDaily.uz) — The European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) could increase costs for Uzbek exporters of fertilisers and metals, prompting calls for domestic carbon regulation, emissions verification and low-carbon production, according to an analysis by the Centre for Progressive Reforms.
The report, written by economic analyst Rahmatilla Ubayev, examines the potential impact of the mechanism on Uzbekistan's exports to the EU and outlines possible measures to reduce the risks.
In 2024, Uzbekistan exported US$1.7 billion worth of goods to the EU and attracted US$4.1 billion in investment from the bloc. The author estimates that exports to the EU may have risen by about 12% in 2025, reaching US$1.9 billion. This estimate applies growth rates for individual sectors to the previous year's export figures.
According to the analysis's baseline estimate, about 9% of Uzbekistan's exports to the EU could fall wholly or partly under CBAM. Fertilisers and certain categories of metals are the main products concerned.
Although the legal obligation to purchase carbon certificates rests with European importers, the associated costs could affect prices, contracts and the market access conditions faced by Uzbek producers.
How CBAM works
On 1 January 2026, the EU moved to the definitive phase of implementing CBAM. The mechanism covers imports of cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen.
European importers must purchase certificates corresponding to the carbon dioxide emissions generated during the production of imported goods.
According to the European Commission, the CBAM certificate price in the first quarter of 2026 was €75.36 per tonne of CO₂.
Certificates for goods imported in 2026 will go on sale on 1 February 2027. Importers must submit their first annual declaration and surrender the required certificates by 30 September 2027.
Changes adopted under the Omnibus Regulation in October 2025 also introduced a 50-tonne threshold. Importers bringing in no more than 50 tonnes of covered goods annually are exempt from reporting and certificate surrender requirements. Hydrogen and electricity are excluded from this exemption.
Fertilisers face potential additional costs
In 2024, uranium accounted for about 46% of Uzbekistan's exports to the EU. The bloc purchased 86% of the country's total uranium exports.
Fertilisers are another significant category in terms of CBAM exposure. Between January and November 2025, Uzbekistan's fertiliser exports increased by 33.7% to US$426 million.
If shipments to the EU grew at the same rate, their value may have risen from about US$96 million in 2024 to US$128 million in 2025. This figure is the author's estimate.
The analysis uses urea as an example to illustrate potential costs. Assuming emissions intensity of 1.6–2 tonnes of CO₂ per tonne of product and a certificate price of €75.36, gross carbon costs would amount to approximately €121–151 per tonne of urea.
At an assumed fertiliser market price of €350 per tonne, this would represent about 35–43% of its value.
The author stresses that this is an illustrative calculation and does not represent actual CBAM liabilities.
Actual payments will depend on verified emissions, adjustments for free allowances and recognition of carbon payments made in the country where the goods were produced.
Free allowances under the EU Emissions Trading System will be phased out gradually. According to figures cited in the analysis, the phase-out will amount to 2.5% in 2026, reach 48.5% by 2030 and be completed in 2034.
Aluminium could gain a competitive advantage
The analysis notes that, according to World Bank estimates for 2025, average emissions intensity in Uzbekistan's aluminium industry is lower than that of EU producers. This could give Uzbek manufacturers an advantage under CBAM.
However, producers will need to demonstrate their actual emissions through reliable monitoring and independent verification at company level to realise this potential.
Four steps to reduce risks
The author proposes four areas of action.
The first is to introduce a domestic carbon price. If a carbon charge paid in Uzbekistan is documented in accordance with EU rules, it could be deducted from CBAM liabilities. This would also allow part of the revenue from carbon regulation to be channelled into industrial modernisation.
The second is to establish a reliable system for measuring, reporting and verifying emissions. Without verified data, exporters risk having their emissions calculated using EU default values, which could result in higher payments.
The third measure is to expand the use of renewable energy in industry. As an example, the author cites the production of the first renewable ammonia at the Acwa Power Chirchiq plant in July 2025.
A project with a capacity of 200,000 tonnes is also under consideration in Navoi. Verified emissions data for fertiliser production using renewable energy could help reduce carbon costs.
The fourth area is to develop technical dialogue with the EU. In October 2025, Uzbek representatives discussed CBAM simplification and technical support for establishing a domestic emissions trading system with relevant European Commission departments.
The author proposes turning these contacts into regular cooperation, with specific assistance programmes, clearly assigned responsibilities and implementation deadlines.
The analysis concludes that the direct costs for Uzbek exporters in 2026 may be relatively modest but are expected to increase as free allowances in the EU are reduced.
To assess the mechanism's actual impact, the author recommends compiling a list of affected export shipments and obtaining verified emissions data from the country's largest producers.
Uzbekistan has set a target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions intensity per unit of GDP by 50% by 2035, compared with 2010 levels.
According to the author, achieving this goal will require effective regulatory instruments, stronger institutional capacity and sustained investment in low-carbon industry.